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We study an organization with a top management (principal) and multiple subunits
(agents) with private information that determine the organizations aggregate e¢ciency.
Under centralization, eliciting the agents private information may induce the principal to
manipulate aggregate information, which obstructs an e¤ective use of information for the
organization. Under delegation, the principal concedes more information rent, but is able
to use the agents information more e¤ectively. The trade-o¤ between the organizational
structures depends on the likelihood that the agents are e¢cient. Centralization is optimal
when such likelihood is low. Delegation, by contrast, is optimal when it is high.
JEL Classication: D82, D86
Key words: Agency, Aggregate Information, Organization Design
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1 Introduction
Organizational structures, as pointed out by Simon (1973), are authority mechanisms that
are constructed to process and aggregate organizational information. In some organizations,
the communication channels are heavily centralized and top management keeps a strong
grip on processing information, while in other organizations, such channels are delegated to
subunits and information is aggregated through a chain of hierarchies. Given the importance
of utilizing an organizations information e¤ectively, understanding the pros and cons of
di¤erent modes of processing information is crucial for the e¢ciency of an organization.
Using an agency model, this study contrasts the task of aggregating information in a
centralized versus a delegated organizational structure. It thereby identies a new type of
incentive problemmanipulation of aggregate information. This incentive problem provides
a novel economic rationale for when and why one structure prevails over the other.
The central trade-o¤ in our paper is as follows. When top management centralizes the
organizations communication channels, inducing truthful behavior of the organizations
subunits may lead to the top managements own misrepresenting behaviorit may have an
incentive to manipulate the aggregate information collected from the subunits. We show
that this tension between the top managements and its subunits incentives stands in the
way of screening, leading to a less e¤ective use of the organizations information.
When top management delegates aggregation of information to a subunit, the ability to
manipulate aggregate information is transferred to that particular subunit. This has two
counter-acting e¤ects. On one hand, the top management has to give more information rent
to that particular subunit to prevent it from manipulating the aggregate information. On
the other hand, the tension between the top managements and the subunits manipulating
incentive vanishes, which allows the organization to use information more e¤ectively.
We identify this trade-o¤ by modeling an internal organization with a principal (top
management) and two agents (subunits) with private information about their e¢ciencies
(types). The aggregated information of the agents types indicates the overall e¢ciency
of the organization. We postulate an organization where the top managements decisions
depend on the organizations aggregate information, instead of detailed information. In fact,
practitioners and organization studies frequently point out top managements limitations
in processing their organizations entire information in detail.1
1For example, in an interview with Harvard Business Review (Taylor 1991), Percy Barnevik, then CEO
of ABB Group, reports that one of the largest obstacles he faces is communication with a large number of
the organizations subunits. See Weick (1995) for an organization study on this issue.
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Under centralization, each agent reports his e¢ciency to the principal directly and no
direct communication takes place between the agents. In this organizational structure,
each agent can, as in standard screening models, reap information rent by misrepresenting
his e¢ciency and the principal responds by distorting the project size downward in the
optimal contract. When these distortions are large, an incentive for the principal arises to
manipulate the aggregate information herself. In particular, when both agents report that
they are ine¢cient so that the organizations aggregate e¢ciency is low, the principal has
an incentive to overstate the aggregate e¢ciency. In other words, the principal gains ex
post by manipulating the aggregate information. We show that reconciling the agents and
the principals incentives hinders an e¤ective use of the agents private information and may
even prevent its use in the sense that optimal contracts exhibit pooling.
Under delegation, one agent, say agent , becomes the superior of the other agent,
say agent . In this structure, agent  rst reports his e¢ciency to agent , who in turn
reports the aggregate e¢ciency to the principal. Since the authority to process the aggregate
information is shifted from the principal to agent , the principal faces a loss of control.
As a result, the principal must concede larger information rent to this agent. In order to
reduce this larger information rent, the principal increases the downward distortions in the
optimal project size. There is a gain, however, from the loss of controla fully separating
outcome is restored, implying that the principal can utilize the organizations information
more e¤ectively under delegation than under centralization.
Comparing the two structures, we show that the likelihood of an e¢cient agent deter-
mines the principals optimal choice of organizational structure. Our result hinges upon
such likelihood because it determines distortions in the project size and thereby the tension
between the principals and the agents manipulating incentives. When the agents are likely
to be ine¢cient, centralization is the optimal organizational structure. By contrast, when
the agents are likely to be e¢cient, the optimal structure is delegation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the related studies. The
model is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss our benchmark to show that, when
the principal cannot manipulate the aggregate information, centralization always dominates
delegation. In Section 5, we compare centralization and delegation when the principal
can manipulate the aggregate information from the agents. In Section 6, we extend our
discussion by endogenizing restrictiveness of communication technology in our model. We
conclude in Section 7. All proofs are relegated to Appendix.
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2 Review of Related Studies
Contrary to the studies that explains organizational structures based on the costs of infor-
mation processing (e.g. Radner 1992, Bolton and Dewatripont 1994, Qian 1994) or problems
of coordination (e.g. Rosen 1982, Harris and Raviv 2002, Hart and Moore, 2005), our pa-
per belongs to the literature that studies organizational structures under ex ante private
information. While earlier contributions advocate centralized structures by identifying loss
of control under delegation (e.g. Williamson 1967, and McAfee and McMillan 1995), there
have been a number of papers identifying situations in which delegation equally matches or
even outperforms centralization.
Distinguishing organizational structures on the basis of di¤erences in monitoring rather
than information ows, Baron and Besanko (1992) and Melumad et al. (1995) identify
necessary conditions under which the vertical hierarchy achieves the same outcome as the
horizontal hierarchy. They demonstrate that if top management can monitor transactions
between the subunits, then the optimal outcome is independent of the organizational struc-
ture. Melumad et al. (1997) show that, when contracts are complex, delegating a contracting
authority to an agent brings the organization more exibility. Severinov (2008) shows that
the optimal structure of operation depends on the rms production technology.
More closely related to ours are the following studies. Focusing on collusion, La¤ont
and Martimort (1998) show that contractual delegation enables organizations under limited
communication to e¤ectively discriminate transfers among di¤erent agents, thus mitigating
collusion. Importantly, delegation in their model involves delegation of contractingunder
delegation, the principal contracts only with the middle-agent, who in turn, contracts with
the bottom-agent. In our model, the principal under delegation still o¤er contracts to both
agentsdelegation only a¤ect the information ows within the organization. Our model of
delegation is more in line with the chain of command model of Friebel and Raith (2004).
The authors show that exclusive communication lines to top management induces middle
managers to make a sincere e¤ort for recruiting and training subordinates. None of these
studies consider the principals manipulating incentive under centralization.
The following studies demonstrate the optimality of delegation under some specic form
of incomplete contracting. Beaudry and Poitevin (1995) and Olsen (1996) point out that
delegation can make it harder to renegotiate. Aghion and Tirole (1997) demonstrate that
delegation induces acquisition of useful information for the organization. Olsen and Torsvik
(2000) show that a rms ability to learn about the di¢culty of the tasks workers engage in
will induce the rm to give workers more discretion over tasks and weaker incentives. Studies
4
such as Dessein (2002) and Alonso et al. (2008) show that organizations can benet from
delegation because it makes better use of private information. Shin and Strausz (2014) show
that delegation mitigates dynamic incentives, when the organization cannot use long term
contracts. Unlike these studies, we focus on organizational structures and the delegation of
information ows rather than decision rights.
Focusing on the manipulation of aggregate information, our paper is related to the
studies on the principals manipulating incentives when contracting with multiple agents.
In McAfee and Schwartz (1994), the principal under limited commitment may have an
incentive to renegotiate with an agent at another agents expense. Studying agents with
correlated private information, Dequiedt and Martimort (2015) analyze a type of informa-
tion manipulation similar to ours. Akbarpoury and Li (2018) study optimal auctions under
an auctioneers manipulating incentives when the bidders cannot observe each others bid.
In spirit, this type of manipulations is similar to the manipulation of aggregate information
which we study. Celik et al. (2018) show that aggregate information manipulation may lead
to an oversupply of public goods. None of these papers consider the e¤ect of the principals
manipulating incentives on organizational structures.
3 Model of Internal Organization
We model an organization with a principal who needs two agents,  and , to implement a
project. The project of size q  0 yields the principal a value v(q); and imposes a cost kq
on agent k 2 f; g: To ensure interior solutions, we assume that v(q) satises the Inada
condition. The project size q is publicly veriable.
Agent ks cost parameter k 2 fg; bg is his private information and   b   g > 0.
We refer to k as agent ks type. An agent of type g is e¢cient, and an agent of type b
is ine¢cient. The agents types are drawn independently from identical distributionsan
agent is e¢cient with probability ' 2 (0; 1), and therefore ine¢cient with probability 1 ':
The probability distribution is public knowledge.
Because the principal needs both agents for the project, the projects aggregate marginal
cost is   + . Since ;  2 fg; bg, the projects aggregate marginal cost has the
following three possibilities:
G  2g; M  g + b; B  2b:
Thus, the e¢cient size of the project, denoted by q; is characterized by:
v0(q) =  ;  2 fG;M;Bg:
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In order to compensate the agents for their costs, the principal pays each agent a transfer,
denoted by tk; k 2 f; g: Given transfers, the principals and the agents payo¤ from the
project of size q are respectively:
  v(q)  t   t and uk  tk   kq:
Reecting usual employment contracts, we impose a non-slavery conditioneach agent can
quit and walk away from the organization at any time. An agent will do so if he expects
his payo¤ to be less than his reservation level of zero.
We compare two organizational structurescentralization versus delegation. Under
centralization, each agent directly reports his type only to the principal, who subsequently
aggregates the informationagents cannot communicate directly with each other.2 Under
delegation, agent  makes a report to agent , who in turn aggregates the information and
reports it to the principalagent  cannot communicate directly with the principal.
Focusing on the crucial role of aggregating information in organizations, we center our
analysis on contracts that are contingent on the aggregate information  2 fG;M;Bg.3









;  2 fG;M;Bg:
As mentioned in the introduction, contracting upon aggregate information reects various
reports of practitioners as well as ndings in organization studies that top managements
tend to work with aggregate, condensed information rather than with the detailed, ne-
grained information at the individual level.















Fig 1. Organizational Structures
2 In Section 6, we discuss and motivate these implicit limitations on communication more extensively.
3See La¤ont and Martimort (1997, 1998) for a similar assumption on contracting.
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The timings under centralization and delegation are summarized below.
Centralization Under centralization, each agent reports his type directly only to the prin-
cipal. Once the reports are made, the principal makes an announcement on  2 fG;M;Bg:








;  2 fG;M;Bg:
2. Each agent makes a report on his type, k 2 fg; bg; to the principal.
3. The principal receives aggregation of the reports and makes a public announcement
on  2 fG;M;Bg:
4. The project is implemented and transfers are paid according to :
Delegation Under delegation, agent  rst reports his information to agent , who then
sends a report on  2 fG;M;Bg to the principal.








;  2 fG;M;Bg:
2. Agent  makes a report on his type  to agent , who in turn, makes a report on
 2 fG;M;Bg to the principal.
3. The principal makes a public announcement on  2 fG;M;Bg:
4. The project is implemented and transfers are paid according to :
Again, each agent can quit at any point in the time (the only relevant decision timing
in this regard is after stage 3).4
In the following two sections, we compare the principals maximum payo¤s under cen-
tralization and delegation. We start analyzing a setup in which the principal cannot ma-
nipulate the aggregate information. In this case, the principal always prefers centralization
over delegation. However, if e¢cient agents are relatively likely, the optimal contract under
centralization provides the principal with an incentive to manipulate aggregate informa-
tion. Taking the principals incentive to manipulate aggregate information seriously reveals
that delegation dominates centralization when it is more likely that the agents are e¢cient,
because in this case the principals manipulation incentive is strongest.
4We implicitly assume that if only one agent quits, the project yields no value to the principal but she still
has to pay the non-quitting agent according to the contract. Alternatively, we could assume that, as soon
as one agent quits, the game ends and all players receive their outside option of zero, but this assumption
has the disadvantage that it may yield an additional equilibrium outcome based on the coordination failure
that agents reject the contracts, since each thinks the other one will do so.
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4 When the Principal Cannot Manipulate Information
4.1 Centralization
Under centralization, the agents report directly and simultaneously to the principal and
are in symmetric positions. As a consequence, an optimal contract exhibits the symmetric
structure, t = t

 = t : Thus, under centralization, we can restrict attention to contracts
of the form (q ; t);  2 fG;M;Bg:
In line with the Inada conditions for the value function, the principal wants a strictly
positive size of the project regardless of the agents types. Since an agent can quit anytime,
and in particular after the principal announces the projects aggregate type , the pair
(q ; t) must provide a non-negative rent to each agent for each  2 fG;M;Bg: For an
e¢cient agent, the following participation constraints must be satised:
tG   gqG  0 and (PCG)
tM   gqM  0; (PCM )
while the constraints below must be satised for an ine¢cient agents participation:
tM   bqM  0 and (PCM )
tB   bqB  0: (PCB)
The left hand side of the participation constraints above are an agents ex post payo¤s when
he truthfully reports to the principal.
To induce each agents truthful report, the following Bayesian incentive compatibility
conditions must be satised:
' [tG   gqG] + (1  ') [tM   gqM ]  ' [tM   gqM ] + (1  ') [tB   gqB] ; (ICg)
' [tM   bqM ] + (1  ') [tB   bqB]  ' [maxftG   bqG; 0g] + (1  ') [tM   bqM ] : (ICb)
When reporting to the principal, each agent does not know the other agents type under
centralization. Therefore, an agents incentive compatibility constraints are conditional only
on his own private information. The left hand side of the constraints express the agents
expected payo¤ from reporting truthfully, whereas the right hand side represents an agents
expected payo¤ if he decides to misreport his type. Notice that, a misreporting agent may
choose to quit. The participation constraints (PCM ) and (PCB), however, imply that an
e¢cient agent will not quit in the case of misrepresenting himself as ine¢cient, regardless
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of the other agents type. An ine¢cient agent, however, may choose to quit after he mis-
represents himself as e¢cient, depending on the principals announcement on . Although
(PCM ) implies that a misreporting ine¢cient agent will remain in the organization if the
principal announces that  =M; but he may quit if  = G is announcedthis is captured
by the rst term of RHS in (ICb).




() = '2 [v(qG)  2tG] + 2'(1  ') [v(qM )  2tM ] + (1  ')
2 [v(qB)  2tB] ;
subject to (PCG) s (ICb): The following proposition presents the optimal outcome in Pc:
Proposition 1 Suppose the principal cannot manipulate the aggregate information. Under
centralization, there exists e'+ 2 (0; 1=2) and e'  2 (0; e'+] such that the optimal contract,
c, entails the following:
 For ' > e'+;
v0(qcG) = G; v
0(qcM ) = M +
'
1  '




An e¢cient agent gets strictly positive rent, and an ine¢cient agent gets no rent.
 For '  e' ;
v0(qcG) = G; 2'v
0(qcM ) + (1  2')v






An e¢cient agent gets strictly positive rent only when  =M , and an ine¢cient agent
gets no rent.
As in the standard screening problems, with an exception of no distortion at the top,
the optimal project sizes are distorted downward. As is well-known, an e¢cient agent has
an incentive to exaggerate his cost of implementation to reap information rent, and in order
to reduce information rent while inducing truthful reports from the agents, the principal
distorts the project sizes in the optimal contract except when both agents are e¢cient.
When ' is large enough (' > e'+), an e¢cient agent receives strictly positive information
rent regardless of the other agents type. When ' is small ('  e' ), however, an e¢cient
agent receives rent only when he is paired with an ine¢cient agent. Since the agents of
di¤erent types receive the same amount of transfer when  = M; the e¢cient agents rent
in that case is guaranteed regardless of '. Because of this, the principals rent provision
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when  = G is relatively smaller, and she decreases the amount of this rent as it becomes less
likely that an agent is e¢cient. As a result, for ' small enough, although an e¢cient agents
expected rent is strictly positive, he gets no rent when the other agent is also e¢cient.
4.2 Delegation
Under delegation, agent  reports his type,  2 fg; bg; to agent  who, in turn, reports
the aggregate type,  2 fG;M;Bg; to the principal. Each agents participation constraints
are:
tkG   gqG  0 and (PC
k
G)
tkM   gqM  0; k 2 f; g; (PC
k
M )
for an e¢cient agent, and
tkM   bqM  0 and (PC
k
M )
tkB   bqB  0; k 2 f; g; (PC
k
B)
for an ine¢cient agent. Notice that, unlike under centralization, the transfers to the agents
cannot be treated symmetrically.
Since agent  does not know agent s type when reporting his own type, his incentive




































Di¤erent to centralization is that, under delegation, agent  has more information when
reporting to the principal, leading to stricter incentive constraints. More specically, the
Bayesian incentive conditions of agent  above imply that agent , when he makes a report
to the principal, has learned agent s type. Inducing agent s truthful report, therefore,
requires that the following incentive compatibility conditions be satised in the optimal
contract:
tG   gqG  t

   gq ;  2 fM;Bg; (IC

G )
tM   gqM  t

   gq ;  2 fG;Bg; (IC

M )
tM   bqM  t

   bq ;  2 fG;Bg; (IC

M )
tB   bqB  t





These stricter incentive constraints reect that, under delegation, agent  has more exi-
bility to manipulate information. Because agent  knows agent s type when making his
report to the principal, the incentive constraints for agent ; unlike the constraints for agent
; have to hold state-by-state rather than only in expected terms.
Under delegation, the principal, chooses  = fq ; t ; t


























subject to (PCkG) s (IC

B ):
The following proposition presents the optimal outcome in Pd.
Proposition 2 Suppose the principal cannot manipulate the aggregate information. Under
delegation, there exists b'+ 2 (0; 1=2) and b'  2 (0; b'+] such that the optimal outcome, d,
entails the following:
 For ' > b'+;
v0(qdG) = G; v
0(qcM ) = B +
3'  1
1  '




An e¢cient agent gets strictly positive rent, and an ine¢cient agent gets no rent.




M : In addition, there exists b > 1 such that:
If b=g > b; then v0(qdG) = G; 2'v0(qdM ) + (1  2')v0(qdB) = B +'2, and
If b=g  b; then '(2  ')v0(qdM ) + (1  ')(1  2')v0(qdB) = B; where qdM = qdG.
Agent , when he is e¢cient, gets strictly positive rent regardless of agent s type.
Agent , when he is e¢cient, gets strictly positive rent only for  =M . An ine¢cient
agent gets no rent.
While the reasoning behind the distorted project sizes is similar to the one under cen-
tralization, agent s information rent is larger under delegation due to his stricter incentive
constraints. By delegating the aggregation of information, the principal is relinquishing part
of her control to agent . Since agent  ends up possessing more information and makes
a report to the principal on behalf of both agents, he has more exibility to manipulate
information, which is the source of larger information rent under delegation. Recall that,
for example, when ' is small, an e¢cient agent under centralization receives rent only when
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the other agent is ine¢cient. The same is true for agent  under delegation since he does
not know agent s type when making his report. In contrast, the principal, regardless of
agent s type, cannot fully extract agent s information rent, because under delegation
agent  knows agent s type when he reports to the principal.
4.3 Comparison
A direct comparison of the two propositions shows that di¤erent contracts are optimal under
the di¤erent organizational structures. When the principal cannot manipulate the aggregate
information, it is relatively straightforward to see that the principal does better under
centralization. The intuition is, as mentioned above, that delegation transfers the principals
control over agent  to agent , without bringing her any benets. A somewhat more
technical perspective provides a deeper insight concerning the optimality of centralization,
leading to a straightforward formal proof. Under delegation, the incentive constraints for
the agent  induces a truthful report regardless of the other agents reporting strategy,
whereas under centralization the incentive constraint induces a truthful report given the
other agents reporting strategy. Hence, delegation leads to dominant strategy incentive
compatibility constraints for agent s truthtelling, while under centralization truthtelling
leads to a Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint for him. Because Bayesian incentive
compatibility constraints are weaker than incentive constraints in dominant strategies, the
principals problem is less restricted under centralization. As a result, the allocation which
the optimal contract under delegation, d, implements is also feasible under centralization,
whereas the allocation which optimal contract under centralization, c, implements is not
feasible under delegation. This observation leads directly to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose the principal cannot manipulate the aggregate information. Then,
centralization dominates delegation.
5 When the Principal Can Manipulate Information
In the previous section, we derived the optimal contracts under the assumption that, after
receiving the agents reports, the principal truthfully announces the aggregate information
from the agents. As we now argue, this assumption is not innocuous since the optimal
contract under centralization, c, provides the principal with an incentive to manipulate
the aggregate information. In particular, the principal, after learning that both agents are
ine¢cient, may benet from misreporting aggregate costs as M rather than B. Lack
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of direct information ows between the agents prevents them from cross-checking their
reports, and the principal can achieve such manipulation without being caught out by the
agentsmaking each ine¢cient agent think that the other agent is e¢cient. In order to
clarify this threat of aggregate information manipulation in centralized organizations, we
start this section with revisiting the organization under centralization.
5.1 Centralization
The threat of aggregate information manipulation by the principal can be easily seen in the
case where both types are equally likely (' = 1=2). In this case, Proposition 1 shows that







M . Hence, the principals ex post payo¤s from a project size qB








Notice that, in Proposition 1, when both types are equally likely (' = 1=2), qcM coincides
with qB; while q
c




B is the unique maximizer of v(q) Bq,












Thus, under the optimal contract c, the principal is strictly better o¤ when reported
aggregate types are M instead of B for ' = 1=2: We state this insight as the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose the principal can manipulate the aggregate information and ' = 1=2.
Under centralization, the optimal contract, c, provides the principal with an incentive to
misreport the aggregate type as  =M when the true type is  = B.
When both agents are ine¢cient ( = B), the principals announcement of  = M
cannot be detected by the agents as a misrepresentationsince it could very well be that
the other agent is e¢cient, without directly cross checking their reports to the principal,
each agent cannot tell whether or not the principals announcement is true.5
Intuitively, the principal has an incentive to exaggerate the overall e¢ciency of the
organization, because the agents then have to complete the bigger project qcM rather than
5 In Section 6, we show that if the principal can choose a communication technology before contracting
with the agents, she may want to choose a technology that limits communication between the agents.
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the smaller project qcB. The manipulation as described in the lemma represents a problem in
organizations pointed out by management studiestop managements abuses of its superior
information at the expense of lower levels in the hierarchy.6 In an organization where
information ow is tightly centralized, the top managements manipulating incentive is an
issue since it has superior access to the organizations bigger picture.
For the principals truthful behavior, the following incentive constraint must be satised
in the optimal contract, in addition to the participation and incentive constraints for the
agents:7
v(qB)  2tB  v(qM )  2tM : (PIC)




() = '2 [v(qG)  2tG] + 2'(1  ') [v(qM )  2tM ] + (1  ')
2 [v(qB)  2tB] ;
subject to (PIC) and the constraints in Pc:
The next lemma makes precise when the principals incentive constraint (PIC) matters.
Lemma 2 Suppose the principal can manipulate the aggregate information. Under central-
ization, there exist '  2 (0; 1=2) and '+ 2 [' ; 1=2) such that:
 For ' < ' ; the principals manipulating incentive is not an issue, i.e., (PIC) is
non-binding.
 For ' > '+; the principals manipulating incentive is an issue, i.e., (PIC) is binding.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is that the distortion in the project size depends on the
likelihood that the agents are e¢cient. Indeed, when such likelihood is small, the principal
expects to provide information rent only with a small probabilityfor small ', distortions
in the optimal project sizes are also small. More specically, for ' small enough, (' < ' ),





As a result, the principal has no incentive to manipulate the aggregate information when
both agents reports that they are ine¢cient.
6See Bartolome (1989) for example.
7Notice that the principal cannot misannounce  = B as  = G since the agents will detect the prin-
cipals misrepresentation in that case. Likewise, when true  = M; the principal cannot misrepresent the
aggregate type as  = B or  = Gif  = B is announced, then the type-g agent will know the principals
misannouncement, and if  = G is announced, then the type-b agent will know. When  = G; the principal
can misannounce the aggregate type as  =M; but she has no incentive to do so.
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By contrast, when the likelihood that the agents are e¢cient is high, the probability
that the principal has to provide information rent is also high. As a result, distortions in the
optimal contract to reduce information rent becomes large. For ' large enough (' > '+);
as in the case of ' = 1=2, the project size qcB is further away from the rst best level q

B than
qcM . When both agents report that they are ine¢cient, the principal prefers to implement
project size qcM rather than q
c
B in such cases, which leads to her incentive to misrepresent
the aggregate information as  =M:
An obvious way to dispel the principals manipulating incentive is to set the same project
sizes for qM and qB. By doing so, she makes herself indi¤erent to her announcement on the
aggregate information (between  = B and  = M when true  = B), and her incentive
constraint (PIC) is trivially satised. The following proposition shows that, when agents
are more likely to be e¢cient, such pooling of project sizes is indeed an optimal to response
to the principals manipulating incentive.
Proposition 3 Suppose the principal can manipulate the aggregate information and ' 
1=2. Under centralization, the optimal outcome, ec; entails:




An e¢cient agent gets strictly positive rent, and an ine¢cient agent gets no rent.
As shown above, under centralization, the principals incentive to manipulate the ag-
gregate information arises when it is likely enough that an agent is e¢cient, and in such a
case, the optimal contracts must discourage the principal from misrepresentation. In cop-
ing with her own manipulating incentive, the principal may pool the project sizes qB and
qM in the optimal contract. Proposition 3 shows that such pooling is optimal when it is
more likely that the agents are e¢cient. The optimality of pooling is due to the fact that
a separating contract requires the principal to concede larger information rent when both
agents are e¢cient. That is, when the agents are more likely to be e¢cient, the principals
own manipulating incentive makes it harder to ne-tune the optimal project sizes according
to the available information in the organization.
5.2 Delegation and Comparison
Under delegation, the principal receives the aggregate information directly from agent .
Any manipulation of the information by the principal is therefore directly detectable by
agent , which prevents the principal from misrepresenting the aggregate information. Thus,
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the same optimal outcome as in Pd is achieved. Recall from the previous section that, in
the absence of the principals manipulating incentive, delegation is always dominated by
centralizationunder delegation, the principal simply needs to provide more information
rent to agent ; who is granted the authority to aggregate information. In the presence of
the principals manipulating incentive, however, a trade-o¤ between these structures arises.
Proposition 4 Suppose the principal cannot manipulate the aggregate information. Then,
there exists 'c > '  and 'd > '+ such that:
 For ' < 'c; centralization dominates delegation.
 For '  'd; delegation dominates centralization.
As shown in Lemma 2, the principals manipulating incentive arises only when the like-
lihood that the agents are e¢cient, ', is large enough. Therefore, for ' small, centralization
remains the prevailing structure. As ' becomes larger, the principals manipulation incen-
tive arises, and a trade-o¤ between the two structures starts to emerge. Under delegation,
although the principal must provide more information rent due to a loss of control, the
optimality of separating types demonstrates that delegation allows the principal to use the
available information within the organization more e¤ectively than centralization.
6 Unlimited Communication and Collusion
In modeling centralization, we postulated that the agents cannot directly communicate with
each other. This limitation on direct communication between agents is crucial for our result,
because the type of information manipulation that we consider is avoidable when the agents
can directly communicate with each otherthe agents could then, by simply cross-checking
their reports, detect the principals manipulation of the aggregate information.
Even though these limits on communication seem natural in large organizations, where
it is infeasible for an agent to cross-check the reports of all other agents, we provide in this
section an endogenous argument for organizations to restrict such unlimited communication.
The gist of this argument is that allowing direct communication between agents may invite
collusion, and dealing with such collusion is more costly to the principal than dealing with
her own manipulating incentive. Indeed, organization studies point out that communication
facilitates collusion, stressing that group behaviors are frequently observed in organizations
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where communication among their members are less restricted.8 Organization theory also
points out the connection of unwanted communication and collusion among agents.9
To see the potential of collusion under centralization, recall from Proposition 1 that,
without information manipulation, the optimal contract under centralization, c, yields an









This inequality implies that, when both are e¢cient, the agents can increase their payo¤ if
they coordinate their reports such that one of them reports to be e¢cient, while the other
misreports his type as ine¢cient. An implementation of this collusive agreement requires
however communication between agents for some coordination to learn each others types
given c; an e¢cient agent has no incentive to misreport his type as ine¢cient to the
principal unless he knows that the other agent will report his type as e¢cient.
To analyze collusion under asymmetric information, we follow La¤ont and Martimort
(1997) and introduce a third party side-contractor who, given the principals grand con-
tract, coordinates collusion between asymmetrically informed agents. The side-contractors
objective is to maximize the expected joint payo¤ of the agents. Given the principals con-
tract under centralization,  = fq ; tg;  2 fG;M;Bg; the side-contractors o¤er to the
agents species a collusive reporting function to the principal,
b : fg; bg  fg; bg  ! fG;M;Bg;
with the interpretation that if agent  reports type  2 fg; bg to the side-contractor and
agent  reports type  2 fg; bg, then the side-contractor reports ̂(; ) to the principal.
La¤ont and Martimort (1997) allows the side-contract to specify side-transfers, but, in our
framework, the threat of collusion has bite without side-transfers. Hence, our concept of
collusion is weaker than the concept in La¤ont and Martimort (1997).10
Indeed, as formally shown in the next proposition, a necessary condition for the princi-
pals contract to be collusion-proof is:
tG   gqG  tM   gqM : (CIC)
8See Mintzberg (1979) for example.
9See La¤ont and Rochet (1997) among others.
10The weaker the concept of collusion, the easier the principal can prevent it. Hence, showing that
collusion is already problematic in this weaker form emphasizes the problem of collusion. Indeed, in our
proof we consider an even weaker form of collusion because we impose the additional restriction that the
side-contractor treats the agents equally.
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() = '2 [v(qG)  2tG] + 2'(1  ') [v(qM )  2tM ] + (1  ')
2 [v(qB)  2tB] ;
subject to (CIC) and the constraints in Pc: Comparing the optimal outcome in Pu to those
in the previous sections leads to the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose the organizations communication technology is the principals choice
and unlimited communication between the agents enables the agents to collude. Then it is
suboptimal to allow unlimited communication between them.
As mentioned above, although unlimited communication between the agents removes
the principals manipulating incentive under centralization, it provides the agents with
more exibility to manipulate their private information through collusion. Our result here
shows that although limiting communication among subunits in an organization causes top
managements manipulating incentive under centralization, it is less costly to the organiza-
tion since unlimited communication among subunits opens the door to collusive behavior
that lowers the organizations optimal outcome.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the optimal structure of an organization when informa-
tion can be manipulated, not only by the agents who possess private information, but also
by the principal who aggregates the information. Under centralization, a tension between
the principals and the agents incentives arises, which may lead to pooling in the optimal
contractunder centralization, an organization prone to aggregate information manipula-
tion cannot use all the available information of its subunits e¤ectively. Under delegation,
although the principal must provide more rent to the agent to whom is delegated the infor-
mation aggregation, the optimal contract is separatingunder delegation, an organization
can use the information of its subunits more e¤ectively. The trade-o¤ between information
rent and the e¤ective use of information determines the optimal structure of the organiza-
tion. Its outcome depends on the extent to which the agents private information leads to
distortions, and therefore the likelihood that agents are e¢cientcentralization is optimal
when such likelihood is low, whereas delegation is optimal when it is high.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Instead of solving Pc, we rst solve the relaxed problem
max

() s.t. (ICg); (PCM ); (PCB):
First note that since () is strictly decreasing in tG, the constraint (ICg) binds for any
solution of this relaxed problemsince otherwise one could raise the objective by lowering
tG without a¤ecting (ICg) and (PCM ). Second, note that since () is strictly decreasing
in tB, also (PCB) binds for any solutionsince otherwise one could raise the objective
by lowering tB, as this change relaxes (ICg) and does not a¤ect (PCM ). Finally, also
(PCM ) binds for any solution, since otherwise one could lower tM by  > 0 and raise tG
by (1  2')='. This change does not a¤ect (ICg) and (PCB), but raises the objective by
2'.
A binding (PCM ), (PC
b
B) and (ICg) give the following expressions for the transfers:






qB; tM = bqM ; tB = bqB: (A1)
Substituting these transfers in the objective () and optimizing with respect to the project
sizes gives:
v0(qcG) = G; v
0(qcM ) = M +
'
1  '









We next check whether this solution to the relaxed problem also satises the neglected
constraints, (PCM ), (ICb), and (PCG). Notice rst that (PCM ) implies (PCM ): Also, by
(A1) the constraint (ICb) simplies to:
0  'maxf0; tG   bq
c
Gg;




B; it follows that:
tcG   bq
c









Finally, to check (PCG), let f c(')  (2'  1)qcM + (1  ')q
c
B, so that the relaxed solution
satises (PCG) if and only if f c(')  0. Because for any ' 2 [1=2; 1), it holds f c(') > 0
and since f c(0) = qB  q

M < 0, continuity implies that there exists at least one e' 2 (0; 1=2)
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such that f c(e') = 0. Let ~'+ 2 (0; 1=2) be the largest (supremum) e' such that f c(e') = 0,
and let e'  2 (0; 1=2) be the smallest (inmum) e' such that f c(e') = 0.
Hence, (A1) and (A2) characterize the principals optimal contract for any '  e'+.
Since, for the case ' < e' ; the above characterization violates (PCG), we next consider
the (less) relaxed problem
max

() s.t. (ICg); (PCM ); (PCB); (PCG);
where we know that, given ' < e' ; the constraint (PCG) binds for any solution. Repeating
the arguments of the beginning of this proof shows that, again, (PCB) and (PCM ) bind at
any solution of this (less) relaxed problem. Given that (PCM ), (PCB), and (PCG) bind,
also (ICg) binds, since maximizing the relaxed problem when disregarding (ICg) yields
the candidate solution qG = qG; qM = q

B, qB = q

B, which violates (ICg). Hence, for any
solution (A1) holds. Together with (PCG) binding, this implies that (1 ')qB = (1 2')qM .
It follows that, with constraints (ICg), (PCM ), (PCB), and (PCG) all binding, we can
rewrite the principals problem as:
max
q
'2 [v(qG) GqG]+2'(1 ') [v(qM ) BqM ]+(1 ')






Substituting out qB(qM ) in (A3) and optimizing with respect to the project sizes yields:
v0(qcG) = G; 2'v
0(qcM ) + (1  2')v






To check (ICb), note again that it is satised if tcG   bq
c
G  0. Using (A1) and the
relationship (1  ')qcB = (1  2')q
c
M , we have:
tcG   bq
c
G =  qG < 0:
Thus, as specied in the proposition, for both ' < e'  and '  e'+ we have characterized
the optimal contract. The agents rents follow from the binding constraints. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we make a conjecture about the relevant constraints
and optimize the objective function under this subset of constraints. We then verify whether
the solution satises the other constraints. In particular, we conjecture that incentive
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and (PCB) are binding. This yields the following expressions for transfers:
tG = gqG +qM ; t








tM = bqM ; t

M = bqM ;




After substituting these transfers in the objective function, an unconstrained optimization
over the remaining variables yields:
v0(qdG) = G; v
0(qdM ) = B +
3'  1
2(1  ')












M ) and (PC

M )















b ) are satised. Hence, it remains to check whether the solution
also satises (PCG). Using (A4), it holds t






0. Hence, let fd(')  (2'  1)qdM + (1  ')q
d
B, so that this solution satises (PC

G) only if
fd(')  0. Because for any ' 2 [1=2; 1), it holds fd(') > 0 and since fd(0) = qB   q

M < 0,
continuity implies that there exists at least one b' 2 (0; 1=2) such that f c(b') = 0. Let
b'+ 2 (0; 1=2) be the largest (supremum) b' such that f c(b') = 0, and let b'  2 (0; 1=2) be
the smallest (inmum) b' such that f c(b') = 0.
Then, it follows that, for ' > b'+; (A4) together with (A5) fully characterizes the optimal
contract as presented in Proposition 2. For '  b' , the solution characterized above violates
(PCG), implying that this participation constraint also binds at the optimum. Under (A4)
the constraint (PCG) simplies to:
(1  ')qB = (1  2')qM : (A6)














'2 [v(qG) GqG  qM ]+2'(1 ') [v(qM ) BqM ]+(1 ')
2 [v(qB(qM )) BqB(qM )] ;
where qB(qM ) = (1  2')qM=(1  ') from (A6). The rst order conditions with respect to
qG and qM imply that the optimal project sizes are characterized by:
v0(qdG) = G; 2'v
0(qdM )+(1 2')v
0(qdB) = B+'
2 and (1 ')qdB = (1 2')q
d
M ; (A7)
implying that qdM > q
d
B. Unlike centralization where the optimal contract only needs to be
Bayesian incentive compatible, delegation requires that the optimal contract be incentive
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compatible in dominant strategy for agent  since he learns agent s type when he makes




B to satisfy all of the
ignored constraints. In fact, the solution characterized in (A7) may not satisfy (ICM G)








B G) with the transfers
for agent  in (A4) require that:
0  (qM   qG):
We next show that for any '  b' , there exists b > 1 such that qdG  qdM if and only if
b=g  b. From (A7), qdG is dened by v0(qdG) = G, while qdM is implicitly dened by the
following equation:
2'v0(qdM ) + (1  2')v
0((1  2')qdM=(1  ')) = G + '
2(  1)g; (A8)
where   b=g > 1. Note that for  = 1 we have qdM > q
d
G, while for  large enough we
have qdM < q
d
G. The result then follows from noting that @q
d
M=@ < 0; so there exists a
unique b > 1 such that qdG > qdM if and only if  > b. To see @qdM=@ < 0, note that by the









= G + '
2g;
and since v00() < 0; the term within the bracket in the LHS of the equation is negative.
Since the RHS of the equation is positive, it follows that @qdM=@ < 0. Hence, for ' < b' 
and g=b > b; the solution in (A7) characterizes the optimal project sizes.
For ' < b'  and g=b  b the solution in (A7) violates (ICM G) and (ICB G) implying
that qG = qM in the optimal contract, and from all binding constraints, we have:
tG = bqM (= gqM +qM ); t

G = gqM ;
tM = bqM ; t

M = bqM ;
tB = bqB; t

B = bqB:





[v(qM ) BqM ] + (1  ')
2 [v(qB) BqB] ;
subject to (A6). It follows that the optimal project sizes are characterized by:
'(2  ')v0(qdM ) + (1  ')(1  2')v







Proof of Corollary 1.
The proof directly follows from comparing Pc and Pd: The incentive compatibility con-
straints in Pd are stronger and therefore the principals choices are more restricted in Pd
compared to Pc: 
Proof of Lemma 1.
The proof directly follows from the discussion. 
Proof of Lemma 2.
In order to show that there exists '  2 (0; 1=2) such that the constraint (PIC) does not
bind, we verify that the optimal contract as identied in Proposition 1 satises (PIC) for
all ' smaller than some '  > 0. To see this, rst recall from Proposition 1 that, for



















B; and with these values, (PIC) is satised in
equality. Using this, we show that (PIC) is non-binding for ' small enough. Dening the
function qM (x) = (1  ')x=(1  2'), (A9) implies that qcB is implicitly dened by:
2'v0(qM (q
c
B)) + (1  2')v
0(qcB) = B:
Di¤erentiating the expression with respect to ' yields:




































B for ' = 0. Now, di¤erentiating the

































M=@' > 0 = @q
c
B=@'; which implies that (PIC) is strictly satised
for ' > 0 close to zero. Since c violates (PIC) at ' = 1=2 from Lemma 1, there exists
'  2 (0; 1=2) such that (PIC) is satised for ' < ' :
To see that c violates the constraint for '  1=2; consider qcM characterized in Propo-
sition 1. Again, at ' = 1=2; we have qcM = q

B and by Lemma 1, (PIC) is violated. By the








where the inequality follows from v00() < 0. As a result, we have for ' > 1=2 that qB > q
c
M :
Also, Proposition 1 implies qcM > q
c
B, and thus it follows from the concavity of v(q)   bq




















This establishes that (PIC) is violated for all '  1=2. By continuity, there exists some
'+ 2 [' ; 1=2) such that (PIC) is violated for all ' > '+. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
For '  1=2; Lemma 2 shows that (PIC) is a binding constraint at the optimum. Since
(ICg), (PCM ), and (PCB) are also binding, binding (PIC) can be rewritten as:
v(qB) BqB = v(qM ) BqM ; (A10)












+ (1  '2) [v(qB) BqB] ; (A11)
which is to be maximized subject to (A10). Note that for ' = 1=2 the objective function
simplies to:
[v(qG) GqG  qB] =4 + 3 [v(qB) BqB] =4;
which is independent of qM . Maximizing this expression with respect to qG and qB, and
setting qM = qB satises (A10) and yields a maximizer that coincides with the expression
in the proposition.
We next show that, for ' > 1=2, a solution satises qM = qB. To see this, note rst that,
for ' > 1=2, expression (A11) is strictly decreasing in qM . Moreover note that (A10) is
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satised whenever qM = qB. These two observations imply that project sizes with qM > qB
are not optimizing (A11), since it yields less payo¤ than project sizes with qM = qB:













+(1 '2) [v(qM ) BqM ] : (A12)
Thus, the solution maximizes (A12) subject to (A10). Note however that (A12) is decreasing
in qB. Project sizes with qB > qM does not maximize (A12) subject to (A10), since it yields
less than project sizes with qB = qM which satises (A10).
For an optimal solution, we therefore have qB = qM so that (A10) is satised and (A11)
simplies to:
'2 [v(qG) GqG + 2qM ] + (1  '
2) [v(qG) BqM ] :
Again, optimizing with respect to qG and qM and setting qB = qM yields the expression in
the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 4.
From Lemma 2, (ec) = (c) for '  ' ; and hence by Corollary 1, (ec) > (d)
at ' = ' : Continuity then implies the existence of 'c > ' ; such that for '  'c;
(ec)  (d): To see the existence of 'd; recall rst from Proposition 3 that, for '  1=2;
the optimal qM and qB are bunched in ec: For '  1=2; it can be easily veried that ec
satises all constraints in Pd; and hence can be implemented in Pd. Since ec 6= d and ec
is not a solution to Pd, it follows, for '  1=2; that (d) > (ec): By continuity there
exists a 'd > '+ such that for all ' > 'd; (d)  (ec): 
Proof of Proposition 5.
As noted in footnote 10, imposing more constraints on the side contractor relaxes the collu-
sion proofness constraints on the principal. Since our objective is to obtain an upperbound
of the principals expected payo¤ under collusion (to compare that expected payo¤ with
the principals expected payo¤ in ePc and Pd), we impose the additional constraint that
the side-contractor treats the agents equallyin particular, b(g; b) = b(b; g) = b(M); as
well as b(g; g) = b(G) and b(b; b) = b(B): Thus, given the principals contract ; the re-
stricted side-contract is  = b(); b;  2 fG;M;Bg: The side-contract is Bayesian incentive
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compatible if the following conditions hold:
'[tb(G)   gqb(G)] + (1  ')[tb(M)   gqb(M)] (A13)
 '[tb(M)   gqb(g;b)] + (1  ')[tb(B)   gqb(B)];
'[tb(M)   bqb(M)] + (1  ')[tb(B)   bqb(B)] (A14)
 '[tb(G)   bqb(G)] + (1  ')[tb(M)   bqb(M)]:





+ (1  ')[tb(M)   gqb(M)] (A15)





+ (1  ')[tb(B)   bqb(B) (A16)
 ' [tM   bqM ] + (1  ') [tB   bqB] ;
The RHSs of the participation constraints, (A15) and (A16), are an agent payo¤s if he
rejects the side-contract. If any agent rejects the side-contract, both agents make reports
according to their best interest according to the principals contract. A reporting function
b() is feasible if it Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational for participation
for each agent of any type. We dene the principals contract collusion-proof if there does
not exist a feasible reporting function b() for which at least one individual rationality
constraint is strictly satised. We restrict our attention to the principals collusion-proof
contracts, which by the collusion-proofness principle of La¤ont and Martimort (1997) is
without loss.
Next, we show that the principals contrct that exhibits tG   gqG < tM   gqM is
not collusion-proof. In doing so, we consider the two collectively exhaustive cases: (i)
where tB   bqB  tM   bqM and (ii) tB   bqB < tM   bqM : For case (i);consider the
side-contract b(G) = b(M) =M and b(b; b) = B: With tG   gqG < tM   gqM ; this side-
contract strictly satises the participation constraint (A15). It also satises (A16) with
equality. In addition, since the principals contract  is Bayesian incentive compatible, the
side-contract also satises (A13). Finally, note that since tB bqB  tM bqM for case (i);
the side contract also satises (A14). This establishes that the principals contract is not
collusion-proof for case (i) if tG gqG < tM gqM : For case (ii); consider the side-contract
b(G) = b(M) = b(B) = M: With tG   gqG < tM   gqM ; this side-contract also strictly
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satises the participation constraint (A15). Since tB   bqB < tM   bqM for case (ii); it
also strictly satises (A16). Moreover, Bayesian incentive compatibility of the principals
contract  implies that the side-contract also satises (A13) and (A14). This establishes
that the principals contract is not collusion-proof for case (ii) if tG   gqG < tM   gqM :
Thus, a direct corollary is that (CIC) is a necessary condition for the principals contract
 to be collusion-proof.
Since (CIC) is a necessary condition for collusion-proofness, we can use it to obtain
an upper bound on the principals payo¤ from the optimal contract in Pu: The binding
constraints in Pu are (CIC); (PCM ); (PCB) and (ICg): It is straightforward to verify that
other constraints are satised by the solution without them. From the binding constraints,
the transfers are:
tG = gqG +qM ; tM = bqM ; tB = bqB;
and the binding (ICg) reduces to qM = qB: After substituting for the transfers with qM = qB
in the objective function, optimization gives the project sizes in Pu; characterized by:
v0(quG) = G; v
0(quM ) = v




The optimal outcome in Pu satises all the constraints in ePc and Pd. Thus, the expected
payo¤ from u can be implemented in ePc and Pd. Since u 6= ec (u = ec for '  1=2)
and u 6= d; it follows that u is dominated by ec and d: 
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